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There is no reason to believe that the Stoics paid more attention to children,
either in theory or in practice, than other philosophers in antiquity. They
expressed interest in and affection for children in general; they mentioned the
behavior of infants and children frequently; they wrote books and letters of
advice to their own children, and spoke about parental, filial, and familial
duties. But so did many other philosophers. There is no evidence that Stoics
wrote books specifically about children, or thought that they should write
such books. This seems a bit odd, given the fascinating outline of child psychology they provided, and especially given that they regularly wrote whole
books specifically about other psychological matters, as well as marriage, love,
the equality of women, and many other issues.
There is evidence, however, that the Stoics paid better attention than their
rivals did to observing, describing, and making theoretical use of the behavior
of children, because they gave us a subtle and powerful developmental psychology-an account that begins with acute observations of the behavior of infants and very young children. These observations are remarkably well confirmed by modern psychology, and provide a persuasive causal account of moral
motivation as well as an intriguing account of the relation between reason
and emotion.
In addition, it may be possible to argue that their accounts of moral motivation, reason, and emotion implicitly commit Stoics to a much more robust
and nuanced respect for children than seems to have been common in antiquity. This is so because, on the Stoic account of things, the sequence of events
that leads from infancy to healthy maturity {and the possibility of virtue} can
be defeated at crucial points very early in life, in ways that make recovery
difficult if not hopeless. Moreover, the developmental theory they proposed
implied that to prevent such damage, one could not simply rely on didactic
training, or wait until a youngster was ready for dialectical instruction; nor
could one simply rely on the knowledge and habits that would be absorbed in
a good polis to prepare the young for moral philosophy. Much more active
intervention was necessary. The Stoics thus arguably had more urgent theoretical reasons than their rivals for insisting that adults pay close, patient, and
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persistent attention to the early health, security, and education of the young.

It seems reasonable to assume that the Stoics recognized those implications of
their theory.
It also seems reasonable to assume that they recognized the contribution
made by their developmental child psychology both to the form of ethical
universalism for which they have been much admired, and to the powerful
forms of psychotherapy with which they have been identified in popular consciousness. It is much less clear whether they also recognized the fact that
their moral psychology committed them to being vigilant about all forms of
what we would now label racism, sexism, and elitism, as well as giving them a
challenging standard for assessing child neglect. And of course they could not
have anticipated that an outline of early childhood education derived from
their work would sound thoroughly contemporary to 20 th century ears.
Whatever one may suppose about the justice of depicting the Stoic sage as
a grim, dispassionate person capable mostly of enduring pain, it is clear that
the Stoics did not expect children to cultivate such characteristics directly.
On the Stoic view of things, infants and children up to the age of about fourteen were constituted very differently than adults. It is the developmental
story the Stoics told about how children are gradually transformed into adults
that gives their views about children special philosophical interest.

Two Quick Preliminaries
Bibliographical Caution
For five hundred years, from roughly 300 BCE to 200 CE, Stoic philosophers
were a leading influence in Hellenistic and Roman intellectual life. They were
prolific writers, revered teachers, and above all systematic thinkers who made
profound, lasting contributions to what we now call metaphysics, logic, philosophy of language, moral psychology, ethics, and political philosophy. They
insisted that each of these fields was intimately connected to the others, and
that making theoretical mistakes anywhere would compromise their entire
enterprise. Some of their contributions, such as their invention of ['ropositionallogic, were misreported and misunderstood until the mid-twentieth century. Their ethics, however, which was the primary source of their fame and
influence in antiquity, was widely and consistently reported, and even though
most of the texts are fragmentary, what remains is of significant philosophical
interest. There is thus no excuse for the desiccated version of stoic ethics that
plagues unreflective modern references to it, despite the persistent efforts of
Hellenists to remind us of its riches.
It must be kept in mind, however, that any attempt to describe Stoic doctrines, even ethical doctrines, will be an exercise in reconstructing arguments
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from a scanty written record. None of the 700 books reportedly written by
Chrysippus, the central figure of the Early Stoa, has survived; nor have any of
Zeno of Citium, the founder of the school. Indeed, none of the works from the
Early and Middle Stoas has survived intact. The lists of titles of such books,
given by Diogenes Laertius, are tantalizing. l (As remarked above, there are no
works mentioned that seem to be specifically on children, although works on
impulses, emotion, love, and marriage are there.) Cicero evidently had access
to many of these books, and he knew and studied with major figures of the
Middle Stoa. But the books themselves survive only in shards of quotation
and description-often from writers hostile to them and to stoicism generally.
The texts we now have to work with are these: (1) roughly half of Arrian's
record of Epictetus' teachings, four of the eight books of his Discourses of
Epictetus having been lost, and the Enchiridion having been drawn from the
Discourses; (2) works by Seneca who, while a committed Stoic, was in his own
estimation an unsystematic literary expositor; (3) Marcus Aurelius' unsystematic and unfinished Meditations; (4) the very useful summaries of Stoic ethical
doctrines given by Cicero, who was not himself a Stoic but who respected
them, and who freely helped himself to their views (Book III of De Finibus is
the best of these texts for our purposes); (5) Diogenes Laertius' somewhat less
helpful summaries in Book VII of his Lives of the Phi/oso/Jhers; (6) a fragment of
a handbook or digest of Stoic ethics from the early second century BCE, written by Hierocles; (7) a scattered array of quotation, paraphrase, summary, announcement, and comment in other ancient (nonstoic) writers. The standard
source in Englbh for these fragments is now volume 1 of The Hellenistic Philosophers, edited by AA Long and D.N. Sedley.2
Beginning in the 1950s, a steadily increasing stream of philosophically important scholarship on Stoic texts has poured forth-a stream that now runs
swift, clear, and deep. It includes both important restatements of Stoic doctrine and philosophical assessments of its cogency, though as yet very little of
it deals directly with children. A small portion of the current literature is cited
in the footnotes here, and readers can find their way into much more of it,
with particular ease, through the text and references in several works listed in
the bibliography: Annas, The Morality of Hap/Jiness; Long, Stoic Studies;
Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire; Schofield and Striker, eds., The Norms of
Nature; and in the bibliographic commentaries to various chapters of Becker,
A New Stoicism.

A Reminder about Stoic Naturalism
The Stoics typically divided the philosophical enterprise into three parts. Physics
was roughly what we would now call a mixture of science, metaphysics, and
theology; logic was roughly epistemology, philosophy of language, formal and
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philosophical logic; ethics was defined broadly enough to include metaethics,
ethical theory, casuistry, moral counseling, psychotherapy, and social, political, and legal philosophy. It seems fair to say that the Stoics expected to be
able to derive their ethical theory from facts about the natural world-from
physics, as it were-by way of logic. There is no parallel, in their ethical theorizing, to the modern preoccupation with logical gaps between facts and values, description and prescription, values and norms. This is so because they
believed that Nature as a whole (the universe; God) was a purposive, rational
being of which humans were a proper part, and that the ultimate or final human good was obviously to be found in perfecting themselves as such a partwhich amounted to perfecting their own human nature. Living consistently
or "conformably" with human nature would a fortiori mean living in accordance with the grand scheme of things. It would mean "following" Nature
with a capital N. Thus while in principle Stoic ethical theory depended upon
getting all of the physics right (all of facts about the world), as a practical
matter Stoics often proceeded by focusing on facts about human nature. 3
This commitment to getting the facts about human nature right led the
Stoics to pay close attention to human biology and psychology. This sometimes had comical results, as when Chrysippus argued that the heart and not
the brain was the seat of consciousness-an argument ridiculed at length by
Galen. 4 But it also produced a subtle and inspiring moral psychology-and
more to the point here, a developmental psychology that made ethical theory
heavily dependent on an account of infancy and childhood. The Stoics insisted that it was only through a proper understanding of the normal course of
human development, from the earliest stages of life to the end, that one could
construct a sound ethical theory. Their insistence on this point was notorious.
Plutarch, for example, says in exasperation,
Why then again for heaven's sake in every book on physics and ethics does he
[Chrysippus) weary us to death in writing that we have an appropriate disposition relative to ourselves as soon as we are born and to our parts and our offspring?'"

Let us see why.

Child Psychology
The Cradle Argument, Oikeiosis, and Moral Development
The Stoic theory of moral development begins with a thesis about the behavior of infants in the cradle-a thesis Stoics advanced in opposition to the
Epicurean account of the same matters. 6 Epicureans insisted that the sovereign motivation of infants was to seek pleasure and avoid pain, and that this
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was (yet more) evidence for thinking that pleasure was, by our very nature,
the ultimate or final human good. Such an inference is only plausible, of course,
if one assumes that human development does not radically transform or eliminate infant behavior but is rather a matter of growth and maturation-growth
in the form of increasing size, complexity, capacity, power, knowledge, refinement, and organization; maturation in the form of the preprogrammed emergence from time to time of added powers, such as language or reproductive
ability, that are characteristic of adults. (And one gets the impression from the
texts that not only the Epicureans but all the philosophers in antiquity except
the Stoics thought of development in more or less that way.) But the Stoics
rejected both the pleasure/pain account of infant motivation and the growth/
maturation account of development. This is the key to their moral psychology
and to the central role child psychology plays in their ethical theory.
On the Stoic account, infants in the cradle are motivated primarily by their
attachment to and "affection" for themselves-attachment and affection that
show themselves in behavior aimed at self-preservation and the satisfaction of
"impulses" of many sorts. Primal impulses may not even include pleasure seeking at all. Cicero says the Stoics insisted on this point. (See the quotation in
note 7 below.) But it was certainly clear to them that infants often subordinated pleasure-seeking to other pursuits such as efforts to move, to explore
their environment, to observe, respond, mimic and learn. This complexity,
the Stoics thought, was simply an undeniable observation about infant behavior. They believed that the obvious explanation for such behavior was that
infants had a primitive consciousness of themselves and their interests, and a
built-in affection (appropriate disposition) for preserving themselves and satisfying all of their interests.? Thus the Stoics held that the Epicurean version
of the cradle argument was unsound if for no other reason than that its premise
about primal impulses was false.
The situation was worse than that, however, not only for Epicureans but for
any ethical theorist who assumed that human psychological development was
primarily a matter of growth and maturation. The Stoics held that psychological
development was self-transfonnative in a predictable way. Indeed, one could read
them as stage theorists about cognitive development. In their view, mature human beings were fundamentally different creatures from immature ones. (Recall Seneca's remark, quoted in note 7, that infants, young adults, and the old
each have different "constitutions.") And they held, against the Aristotelians,
that habituation was not the fundamental mechanism of character formation.
Rather, they thought that the fundamental mechanism was oikeiosis. 8
The term oikeiosis is hard to put into English. It has sometimes been translated as familiarization, because it has the same root as house or family. But it
is probably better translated as attachment, incorporation, or appropriation. I
will follow Long and Sedley in using the English term appropriation for it.~
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Here is how the developmental process goes, according to the Stoics. Children grow and mature, of course, as other philosophers routinely noted in
passing. Newborns have a small array of crude, primal impulses and very limited powers. Infants and children increase in size and physical strength; their
powers oflocomotion and perception increase; they accumulate memories from
a wider and wider range of experience; new powers {notably language} and
new impulses {such as an urge for reproduction} are added to their repertoires
as they ripen into adolescence and adulthood-and some are subtracted as
adults move through middle and old age; children acquire useful habits of
inquiry, inference, and conduct, which they refine through trial and error;
they generalize, hypothesize, observe outcomes, and acquire a more or less
theoretical understanding of things, and eventually they may come to see that
practical wisdom requires them to be just, courageous, temperate, benevolent-in a word, virtuous. But that is only what is happening on the surface, as
it were. What the Stoics offer in addition to these conventional observations
about growth and maturation is an account of the psychodynamics of human
development-an account of the causal story, at a psychological level, that
leads from infancy through childhood to adulthood.
Oikeiosis is the psychological mechanism that the Stoics put at the center
of this causal explanation. It works this way.lO Early in infancy children's natural affection for themselves is extended to external physical objects and states
that are {or appear to them to be} instrumental to satisfying their primal impulses. Infants acquire an affection for the breasts that feed them; comfortable
positions in which they are held; interesting or pleasurable motions, sounds,
smells, sensations; certain cloths and toys; certain faces, and expressions on
those faces; the very cradle itself. These things are "perceived" in a primitive
way as extrinsically or instrumentally valuable. Then a fundamentally important transformation occurs. Infants and very young children soon begin to
"appropriate" these useful objects psychologically-making the external things
"their own," as it were, in a way that makes the affection for them like the natural
affection the infants have for themselves. This makes the infants disposed to preserve {and act for} the external things in the same way they are disposed to
preserve and act for themselves. Thus the initial, conditional affection for the
things as means to ends is converted, through oikeiosis, into an affection that is
quite independent of perceptions of a thing's instrumental worth. It does not
matter that the breast is dry, the brightly colored object is dulled, the blanket
is no longer warm, the cradle is no longer big enough. Insofar as we have
"appropriated" such things, we have affection for them in themselves, for their
own sakes. They have intrinsic value for us. {We often develop strong attachments to them also, and the proper management of attachments is a central
theme of Stoic ethics.}

Stoic Children 5 I
An even bigger change occurs when children acquire language and begin
to represent states of affairs and causal connections to themselves, and to generalize, hypothesize, and make rules about how to get what they want. The
same two-step process occurs here as well, with dramatic consequences. Children first develop an affection for the beliefs and inferences that are instrumental {the ones that work; the "correct" ones}, just because those are the
ones that work. A similar affection arises for rule-following behavior that is
successful. Then, through oikeiosis, children at a surprisingly early age begin to
appropriate their useful beliefs, generalizations, rules, and expectations-and
thus to convert affection for the instrumental worth of such things into affection for the things in themselves. Children thus come to have an affection for
true belief, correct conduct, and rule-following for its own sake, quite independent of its usefulness. This is, moreover, a recursive process. Beliefs are
repeatedly modified in the light of new experience. Inconsistencies are repeatedly dealt with in order to make it possihle for conduct to conform to all
the beliefs one has. Children thus come to value regional coherence or consistency as well as local correctness-first for instrumental reasons, and then
through oikeiosis, for its own sake.
The penultimate step comes with the realization of the instrumental value
of practical intelligence itself, and the attendant affection that children develop for doing things correctly {in the right way, for the right reasons}. This
is quite distinct from the ever present affection for getting the desired outcome. The novice archer wants to hit the target, certainly, hut comes to appreciate that the most reliahle way to get that result is hy making the shot correctly. And this lesson, once learned in a few contexts, is generalized into an
affection for procedure, technique, skill, and practical intelligence of all sorts.
Affection for the usefulness of these things is then also transformed, through
oikeiosis, into an affection for them that is quite independent of their utility.
Children come to value, for its own sake, doing things in the right way for the
right reasons.
The final step {plausihly the step into full maturity, though this characterization of it is not fully explicit in the texts} comes from the cultivation of
practical intelligence, once we love it both for its utility and for its own sake.
We see that hitting the target {getting many of the things we want} is not
ultimately within our control, and not within our control at all except though
the {correct} exercise of our practical intelligence. Getting that much right
{perfecting our ahility to do the right thing in the right way} thus becomes our
paramount concern in every context. At first, of course, we want this merely
as a means to our other ends. But we quite naturally appropriate it as well, and
through oikeiosis, come to have a paramount concern for perfecting the exercise of our practical intelligence for its OU'7l sake.
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The connection of all of this to ethical theory is that the Stoics identified
this final stage with the pursuit of virtue. Virtue, they held, was for humans
the perfection of reason, where what is meant by reason is perhaps better expressed by the notion of the perfection of the exercise of our agency via practical intelligence. Stoics notoriously insisted that virtue was the only good;
that it was sufficient for happiness; and that it was an all or nothing thing.
Those hard doctrines need not detain us here.
There are, however, several remarkable things about the oikeiosis-driven
account of childhood moral development that require comment.
First, the account is put forward as the typical, natural sequence of events
for children-something that will inevitably occur in favorable circumstances,
given the sort of constitution human infants and children have. Virtue, as the
culmination of this process, is thus equally possible for males and females,
slaves and freemen, nobles and peasants-unless something in the circumstances of a given group systematically defeats the normal course of development for its members. Moreover, since the deliberate imposition of such
"defeaters" would be an act in opposition to nature, Stoics were theoretically
committed to rejecting any form of sexism, racism, slavery, or elitism that
imposed developmental defeaters. There is ample evidence that Stoics regularly saw and acted on some of these implications. They admitted women to
the Stoa and gave arguments for their equality.ll They recognized the cosmopolitan implications of their theory. The leaders and pupils of the Stoa were as
likely to be drawn from the ranks of ordinary citizens as from an elite. One of
their most famous teachers (Epictetus) had been a slave in Rome-indeed
had studied with a Stoic teacher while enslaved. And it is certainly clear from
Marcus Aurelius' musings that he did not think his being Roman Emperor
gave him special access to virtue.
Second, the Stoic account of moral development is about the way things
go for infants and children who are healthy and well-cared for by adults. The
Stoics were ViVidly aware of the ways in which deformities, ill-health, or abuse
could interfere with the process. Moreover, it seems reasonable to assume that
they would have been aware that their theory gave them both a way of setting
a standard against child neglect and abuse, and of setting up a rather detailed
curriculum for the educational system. I will not attempt to trace out these
implications for child care and education here, except to point out how congruent they will be with the sort of state-endorsed (as opposed to state-permitted) policies common in developed liberal democracies. Good parenting and
good education in both settings are fundamentally directed at enabling children to become healthy, autonomous, broadly capable, and effective agents
who not only pursue their own vision of the good life but who are reciprocally
tolerant, cooperative, and benevolent towards others who have significantly
different conceptions of the good life. Limitations on a child's freedom, and
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affirmative duties to provide for a child's physical and psychological well-heing, are in both cases assessed in terms of these developmental goals. And in
both cases it is assumed that if children develop in the normal way within
such a framework for child care and education, and if subsequently those individuals as adults continue to have reasonahly favorahle circumstances for exercising their agency, that satisfactory progress toward individual virtue and a
just society will follow as a matter of course.
Third, on the Stoic account, the infant's natural, initial focus on self-preservation and self-interest for its own sake is very quickly supplemented hy an
equally natural focus on the needs and interests of others, as ends in themselves. Various fragments, notahly one now attrihuted to Hierocles,12 suggest
that some Stoics might have thought that oikeiosis worked along two tracks.
One had its roots in the infant's primal affection for itself; the other had its
roots in an equally primal, non instrumental affection for other human heings.
The latter, "social" affection then hecame the source for the workings of "social oikeiosis"-the process hy which this affection for others as ends in themse lves is refmed (distinguishing friends from foes, for example), and is extended
from local to regional and ultimately universal scope. It is not clear that all
Stoics held this two-track view, however. And it is an empirical question as to
whether such a primal social affection is part of our repertoire. But it is clear
that nothing in Stoic ethical theory will hang on the answer to that empirical
question. For even if the social impulse is not primal, it is clear that in the
normal course of events it will quickly arise through non-social oikeiosis, and
then he refined and extended. Moreover, hoth tracks inevitably lead to forms
of impartiality and reciprocity that ground principles of justice. ll
Impulse, Representation, Belief, Emotion, anJ Rationality
The transformation of our motivational structure wrought hy oikeiosis is dramatic,
and central to ethics. But the Stoics thought that there was a yet more fundamental sort of transformation produced hy the deVl'lopment of our pOWl'rs of reason.
This second sort of transformation also had to do with motivation, and was
fundamental to the doctrine that has become synonymous with stoicism in
modern popular consciousness-namely, the "extirpation of the passions."14
Explicating this aspect of Stoic theory is difficult, however. In part, this is due
to the fact that the texts are more than usually scanty. But matters are not made
any easier hy the fact that the texts we have are silent on the causal principle
involved in the transformation: we have nothing to work with in this context
that is comparahle to the notion of oikeiosis. Rather, we are simply presented
with assertions ahout the end result, and left to guess what the mechanism of the
transformation is. Moreover, Stoics disagreed among themselves abollt the
nature of the transfnrmation. So what follows is necessarily quite speculative. II
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It is clear enough that leaders of the Early Stoa, especially Chrysippus, vigorously opposed the Platonic conception of mind or soul. For one thing, the
Stoics were always thoroughgoing materialists, and in their view mental events
were physical objects. That alone put them at odds with Plato, not to mention
in opposition to what we now call substance dualists of all sorts. But more to
the point here, the Stoics rejected the notion that the mind of a mature human being was organized into separate faculties, functioning more or less autonomously, and each capable by itself of causing a person to act.
The emphasis in the preceding phrase is needed to avoid confusion. Stoics
regularly used the language of mental faculties-speaking, for example, of "the
commanding part" of the soul (reason), in opposition to impulses, emotions,
or passions. But they held that once reason develops sufficiently, it always
plays a decisive role in determining human conduct. In particular, they rejected Plato's tripartite conception of the soul, at least insofar as it was committed to the view that our appetitive or "spirited" parts could be the immediate causes of action in an adult. Presumably the Stoics would have had the
same objection to all the successors to Plato's conception-including its recent Counterparts in various versions of Freudian theory-though of course
they would have been ultimately committed to accepting the best science on
the matter. Similarly, they probably would have had difficulties with current
theories of the modularity of mind.
What the Stoics offered instead was again a developmental account-one
in which the gradual development of rationality, from infancy through childhood, ultimately transformed the mind in a fundamental way. The central
feature of such development, they thought, was the way belief transformed
impulse, affect, emotion, and passion. Here we must begin to interpolate and
speculate to a significant extent. But the following seems plausible.
In infants, impulses and affective states are either spontaneous or a matter
of reflex. They can be highly differentiated-stimulus and response-specific, as
in the case of fear of a particular sound; quite generalized, as in fear of any dark
bedroom; or generalized to the extent of a fundamental temperament (basic
anxiety). But in the normal course of cognitive development, children begin to
represent such experience propositionally, then to believe some and reject other
Propositions about the experience, and finally to "assent" to certain beliefs in
a way that makes those beliefs the immediate causal determinants of action.
Once that happens, the causal sequence that generates impulses and affective
states can be reversed: such things can then be the consequences of beliefs, and
be differentiated by the cognitive content of those beliefs. (Ghost stories about
dark bedrooms can raise goose bumps.) Moreover, in the normal course of
development, the practice of representing experience, and of assenting to beliefs
about it, becomes relentless and pervasive for the child. This then has pervasive consequences for the occurrence and nature of our affective states. More
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and more of them will be, as it were, supervenient upon our beliefs-and responsive to changes in those beliefs. Thus we find over and over in Stoic manuals
that their advice for dealing with troublesome emotions is little more than persistent advice to get the facts right-to focus on correcting errors in one's beliefs.
The nature of the final step in the process is not very clear in the texts. At
least it is not clear to me. Stoics evidently thought that children who developed
normally would eventually cross a threshold and be transformed in a fundamental way-from animals whose conscious behavior was frequently determined
directly by impulse, emotion, reflex, and routine, into animals whose conscious
behavior was always directly caused by the beliefs to which they assented.
(The Stoics apparently thought that this transformation usually occurred at
about age fourteen. J6 ) What was in dispute among Stoics themselves was the
precise nature of this transformation, and perhaps the mechanism behind it.
We have very little evidence about what they thought the mechanism might
be. One can suppose that something like a critical mass phenomenon might
occur, so that once a large enough number and range of a child's emotional
states were supervenient upon beliefs, the frequency and range of such experience would somehow feed on itself and increase of its own accord. Then if, as
the Stoics imagined, the child's belief structure naturally tended toward global
coherence, affective states supervenient on beliefs in a coherent set might be
in some analogous way coherent (psychologically "consonant" rather than
dissonant) and perhaps even mutually reinforcing. In that case one might often expect to find seamless modulation from one emotional state to the next,
at least when the child is moving through a sequence of closely related beliefs.
And even in cases of sharp discontinuity (induced, perhaps, by a sudden leap
from one belief to another that is nowhere in the logical or psychological
vicinity of the first), one might still expect to find the consequent, disjointed
emotional states in harmony with one another. Moreover, one might suppose
that this ever enlarging process might eventually crowd out primal impulses,
affective reflexes, and spontaneous affect altogether. Perhaps ChrysipplIs held
a view something like that. But perhaps not. Perhaps he had a mechanism in
mind that was as original in its way as oikciosis is in its. This seems unlikely if
only because there does not seem to have been suhsequent discussion of the
matter. So one is reduced to speculation on this point. But by all accounts
Chrysippus certainly did hold that the end result of the process was a mature,
rational agent in whom "non-propositional" emotional states and impulses
were absent.
Posidonius, an important member of the Middle Stoa, disagreed. lie held
that primal impulses and spontaneous emotions were never rooted out. Some
commentators have thought that he was therefore returning to a Platonic
account of mental faculties. But it now seems more reasonable to suppose that
Posidonius remained firmly opposed to Plato on this point, and merely held
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the quite reasonable view that primal impulses, affective reflexes, and spontaneous emotion operated throughout our adult lives in much the same way
external stimuli do-as inputs with which we cope. The difference between
children and mature adults on this score would then be in the swiftness and
completeness with which their rationality captured such experience and either (a) interposed itself as the immediate causal source of our behavior, or (b)
did that and in addition actually made emotion supervenient upon beliefs.
This difference would count as a fundamental transformation if, for example,
primal impulses, affective reflexes, and spontaneous emotion simply could not
persist and blossom directly into action in healthy, mature adults-if instead,
as quickly as such things emerged they would be nipped in the bud and replaced by propositional attitudes whose power to determine our conduct came
wholly from our assent to the propositions involved. The mechanism for that
sort of transformation might be simply that the child's practice of representing
experience propositionally, once it gets going, quickly becomes imperialistic,
and eventually operates always, everywhere in the child's experience. And
then one can Suppose that habituation could increase the speed, accuracy and
completeness with which children propositionalize their experienceY That
would eventually lead to a situation in which there is little or no opportunity
for spontaneous emotion ever to persist, let alone blossom into action.
Being transformed in that way would not, of course, entail the absence of
wildly inappropriate emotions. Such emotions in an adult, however, would be
generated by false or inconsistent beliefs-for example, beliefs that, when assented to, simply replicated or reinforced the motive power of inappropriate
primal emotion. (Attorney: "You've got to get control of your anger. Think of
the consequences." Client: "I'm thinking about revenge.") The therapy for them
would be very different, then, than the therapy for violent and inappropriate
emotion in a child. In the case of an adult, one would expect standard Stoic
practice (much like its contemporary descendant, Rational-Emotive Behavior Therapy) to work quite well across the board, because it is the adult's assent to inappropriate beliefs that is ultimately doing the causal work. In the
case of children, one could have no such across-the-board expectation, and
might often find that causing the child to "focus on the facts" would have no
useful effect at all. For adults who are resistant to Stoic therapy, the proper
Course would be to find ways to get them to attend to the facts. For young
children, the proper course would be to accelerate the imperialistic development of their efforts to capture their experience in propositional terms.

Concluding Remark
It may well be that the Stoics overstated the extent to which these two transformations-one in moral motivation and one in the relation between reason
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and emotion-occurred in the normal course of development from infancy to
what we would now call early adolescence (that is, age fourteen). The Stoics
were, of course, vividly aware of the difficulties adults of all ages have in governing their emotions, and in acting appropriately. So they cannot have meant
that cognitive and moral development was complete by the age of fourteen,
and it seems peculiar to insist that even all the fundamental changes would be
complete by that age. What is evidently missing is a developmental account
of adolescence, and perhaps a stage theory of young, middle, and old age as
well. And given the power and originality of the Stoic account of childhood
development, it is tantalizing to try to imagine what they might have done if
they had addressed themselves to later stages. But even though wishing is a
Stoic-approved emotion, 1M perhaps we should simply be grateful for what we
already have from the Stoic tradition.

Notes
1. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent PhilosolJhers, Edited hy T. E. Page and
translated hy R. D. Hicks. The Loeh Classical Library. Cambridge, MA and London:
Harvard University Press and William Heinemann Ltd, 1931 [2nd century CEI. Book
VII.
2. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, eds., The Hellenistic PhilosolJhers, New York: Camhridge University Press, 1987. Vol. I.
3. There is a lively debate among Hellenists ahout whether Stoic theology and
cosmic teleology plays a logically necessary role in their ethics. lll\1y Long thinks it
does. See, for example Long, "Stoic Eudaimonism," Proceedin!!s of the B05(On Colloquium in Ancient PhiloSOlJhy 4 (1988): 77-101, reprinted along with other important
papers in Long, S(Oic Studies, New York: Cambri,lge University Press, 1996. For opposition, see Annas, The Morality of HlIPfJiness , New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Ch 5, and Engberg-Pedersen, The Swic Theory of Oikeimi.1 Denmark: A,lrhus Universi ty Press, 1990.
4. Galen, On the Doctrine.1 of Hi/,polTate.1 and I'lalO, Tramlated hy Phillip De Lacey.
Berlin: Akademie- Verlag, 1984, I-II. In the course of his lengthy and scathing attack
on Chrysippus throughout the work, Galen pTl'ser\'es some important fragments, not
only of his target's arguments, but also (especially in Books IV-V) those of Posidonius,
from the Middle Stoa.
5. From Plutarch, On Swic Self-Contradictions, at 1038 b. Quoted in Long and Sedley,
The Hellenistic Philosol>hers, 348.
6. These theses are now often known as "cradle arguments," a term that by extension can apply to the entire account of moral development, beginning at the cradle.
For a summary of such controversies and evi,lence of their prevalence in antiquity, see
Brunschwig, "The Cradle Argument in Epicureanism and Stoicism," in The Nmms of
Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics, edited hy Malcolm Schofield and Gisela Striker,
Camhridge: Camhridge University Press, 1986, 113-44. Ill' opens his essay this way:
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"All the ancient philosophers, in particular those of our school, turn to cradles
[ad incunabula acceunt] because it is in childhood [in pueritia] that they think we
can most easily recognize the will of nature .... " Piso, disciple and mouthpiece
of Antiochus of Ascalon in Cicero's De Finibus, is perfectly correct in his assertion {V 55}: the moralists of the Hellenistic period, of whatever school, made
frequent use of what may be called the cradle argument, that is, a procedure
which consists first in describing {or in claiming to describe} the behavior and
psychology of the child in the cradle {usually in conjunction with young animals} and then in drawing {or claiming to draw}, more or less directly, certain
conclusions which, in one way or another, lead to the formulation and justification of a moral doctrine. {113}
It should be noted that Brunschwig finds little evidence in the ancient texts to
support the view that the philosophers involved did any systematic empirical, or even
observational, work on the behavior of children. I do not dispute that as a statement
about what is explicit in the texts, but I suggest that the nature of the Stoic account of
psychological development gives us reason enough to believe that they were careful
observers.
7. This passage from Cicero's De Finibus Ill.v is typical. Cato is speaking to Cicero
on behalf of stoicism.
It is the view of those whose system I adopt, that immediately upon birth {for
that is the proper point to start from} a living creature feels an attachment for
itself, and an impulse to preserve itself and to feel affection for its own constitution and for those things which tend to preserve that constitution; while on the
other hand it conceives an antipathy to destruction and to those things which
appear to threaten destruction. In proof of this opinion [stoics] urge that infants
desire things conducive to their health and reject things that are the opposite
before they have ever felt pleasure or pain; this would not be the case, unless
they felt an affection for their own constitution and were afraid of destruction.
But it would be impossible that they should feel desire at all unless they possessed self-consciousness, and consequently felt affection for themselves. This
leads to the conclusion that it is love of self which supplies the primary impulse
to action. Pleasure on the contrary, according to most Stoics, is not to be reckoned among the primary objects of natural impulse; and I very strongly agree
with them, for fear lest many immoral consequences would follow if we held
that nature has placed pleasure among the earliest objects of desire. But the fact
of our affection for the objects first adopted at nature's prompting seems to require no further proof than this, that there is no one who, given the choice,
would not prefer to have all the parts of his body sound and whole, rather than
maimed or distorted although equally serviceable.
And from Seneca, Letters, 121.15 Quoted in Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Phi-

losophers, 347:
A baby who is set on standing up and is getting used to supporting himself, as
soon as he begins to try his strength, falls down and with tears keeps getting up
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again until he has trained himself through pain to do what nature demands ...
A tortoise on its back feels no pain, but desire for its natural state makes it
restless, and it does not stop struggling and shaking itself until it stands on its
feet. So all animals are conscious of their own constitution, and this explains
such easy handling of their limbs .... (3) Each period of life has its own constitution, one for the baby, and another for the boy, <another for the youth,> and
another for the old man. They are all related appropriately to that constitution
in which they exist.
Note the suggestion of a stage theory of development.
8. It was sometimes thought that the term and concept originated with Aristotle,
but that has now been definitively rejected. See Pembroke, "Oikeiosis," in Problems in
Stoicism, edited by A. A. Long, London: The Athelone Press, University of LonJon,
1971,112-49, for an analysis.Oikeiosis is to Stoic ethics what habituation is to Aristotle.
AnJ it is, in my view, their most original and important contribution to ethics.
9. Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 351.
lO. See Cicero, De Finibus, IIl.v-vi. Compare Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, VII, 85-88. There is a careful and illuminating analysis of the latter
version in Long, "The Logical Basis of Stoic Ethics," Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society 71 (1970-71): 85-104, which is reprinted in Long, Stoic Studies.
11. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1994,322ff.
12. Long, and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 347-8, 349-50.
13. Either way then, Julia Annas is wholly convincing on the point that
eudaimonistic ethics is not necessarily egocentric, anJ that the Stoics show us this in
an especially clear way. See Annas, The Morality of Ha/Jpiness, Part III.
14. Nussbaum, The Therapy of Desire, Chap. JO.
15. For its outlines, anJ the iJentification of its few secure points, we are inJebteJ
to KiJJ, "PosiJonius on emotions," in Problems in Swicism, eJiteJ by A. A. Long, 20015; Inwood, Ethics and Human Actiun in Early Stoicism, OxforJ: Clarendon Press, 1985,
and many other scholars. In particular, my account here owes a great deal tn John
Cooper's lucid recent paper Cooper, "Posidonius on Emlltions," in The Emotions in
Hellenistic Philusophy, edited by Troels Engherg-PeJersen anJ Juha Sihvola, DorJrecht,
The NetherlanJs: Kluwer Academic Publbhers, forthcoming.
16. Diogenes Llertius, Lives of the Eminent Philoso/Jhers, 7, 55-56, says "An animal's
utterance is air that has been struck by an impuh,e, but that of a man is articulated anJ
issues from thought, as Diogenes [of Babylon] says, anJ is perfected at the age of fourteen." Quoted in Long and SeJley, The Hellenistic Phi~)so/)hers, 197. But notice that
reason itself has completely emerged by age seven. See Long anJ SeJley, The Hellenistic Philoso/Jhers, 238, quoting from Aetius:
When a man is born, the Stoics say, he has the commanJing-part of his soul like
a sheet of paper reaJy for writing upon. On this he inscribes each one of his
conceptions. (2) The first methoJ of inscription is through the senses. For by
perceiving something ... they have a memory of it when it has JeparteJ. AnJ
when many memories of a similar kind have occurreJ, we then say we have
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experience. For the plurality of similar impressions is experience. (3) Some impressions arise naturally ... and undesignedly, others through our own instruction and attention. The latter are called 'conceptions' only, the former are called
'preconceptions' as well. (4) Reason, for which we are called rational, is said to
be completed from our preconceptions during our first seven years.
17. Posidonius did make an important place for habituation in his psychology. See
Cooper, "Posidonius on Emotions."
18. In a famous passage Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, VI1.116,
quoted here from Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, 412, says:
(1) They [the Stoics) say that there are three good feelings: joy, watchfulness,
wishing. (2) Joy, they say, is the opposite of pleasure, consisting in well-reasoned swelling [elation); and watchfulness is the opposite of fear, consisting in
well-reasoned shrinking. For the wise man will not be afraid at all, but he will
be watchful. (3) They say that wishing is the opposite of appetite, consisting in
well-reasoned stretching [desire). (4) Just as certain passions fall under the primary ones, so too with the primary good feelings. Under wishing: kindness,
generosity, warmth, affection. Under watchfulness: respect, cleanliness. Under
joy: delight, sociability, cheerfulness.
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